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Defendant/Appellant. ) 
* * * * * 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant 
to the provisions of Section 78-2A-3(g), Utah Code Ann, (eff. 
Jan. 1, 1988), as this is an appeal from a final order 
involving a divorce. After trial in January, 1986, the court 
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce granting appellant, Mrs. Jense, a divorce under 
her Counterclaim on July 9, 1986. On December 7, 1987, the 
court granted respondent' s Motion to Amend the Decree of 
Divorce after determining that there had been significant 
changes of circumstances rendering ineffective the court' s 
prior decision effecting its intention to equally divide the 
marital estate of the parties. The court then amended the 
original Decree of Divorce in order to achieve the equitable 
distribution originally contemplated. The Order further 
moderated enforcement of a subsequent judgment on the 
original Decree of Divorce obtained by appellant, Mrs. Jense, 
on April 1, 1987. On December 8, 1987, the court denied 
appellant' s Motion for a New Trial. Appellant appeals the 
court' s Order to Amend and the court' s denial of her Motion 
for New Trial. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by: (1) 
Amending the original Decree of Divorce and moderating 
enforcement of a subsequent judgment obtained thereon after a 
showing of substantial change in circumstances, in order to 
achieve the equitable distribution originally intended by the 
court; (2) Granting plaintiff's Motion to Amend after 
defendant' s counsel consented to proceed on the basis of 
2 
affidavits before the court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
provides: 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for 
the support and maintenance of the 
parties. . . or the distribution of the 
property as is reasonable and necessary. 
Rule 9, Supplementary Rules of Practice, Third 
Judicial District (eff. 6/1/87): 
Modifications of Divorce Decrees. 
a. When a modification in the terms and 
conditions of a Decree of Divorce is 
sought, the issue shall be raised by 
filing a Petition for Modification and 
service of said petition and summons upon 
the opposing party in accordance with the 
requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. No request for 
change or modification of a Decree shall 
be raised by an order to show cause. 
b. After a responsive pleading is filed, 
and discovery has been completed, counsel 
shall file a certificate of readiness for 
trial, and the matter shall then be heard 
by the assigned judge. 
c. No petition for modification shall be 
placed on any law and motion or order to 
show cause calendar without the consent 
of the judge to whom the case is 
assigned. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Trial in this matter was held on January 4, 1986 
(R. 85) after which the court, by memorandum decision, 
divided the property of the parties (R. 86-88). Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce effecting 
the court's decision were entered on July 9, 1986 (R. 108-
115, 123-129). In order to equalize the marital estate, the 
court ordered a property settlement in which the plaintiff 
was required to pay certain lump sums to the defendant. The 
judgment was based upon a pattern where the plaintiff, for 
many years, had been paid a substantial bonus in February or 
March of each year, based upon the earnings of his employer 
for the prior year (R. 112-113; Tr. of Aug. 29, 1987 hearing, 
p. 14). 
On April 1, 1987, defendant obtained judgment 
against the plaintiff in the amount of $43,314.46 pursuant to 
the Decree (R. 144). However, the plaintiff did not receive 
his 1986 bonus (R. 173) and, as a result, the trial court, on 
April 6, 1987, stayed execution on the $43,314.46 judgment 
for a period of four months (R. 146-148). 
The plaintiff was terminated from his employment on 
July 17, 1987 (R. 173). 
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The house owned by the parties in Utah County which 
had been valued by the court at the time of the divorce at 
$150,000.00, was sold in 1987 for a net selling price of 
approximately $119,000.00. The net proceeds of that sale 
were approximately $20, 000. 00 in contrast to the $50,000.00 
the court believed at the time of the divorce would be 
produced by the sale of that property (R. 261-262). 
The plaintiff requested the trial court to amend 
the Decree and to moderate enforcement of the April 1, 1987, 
judgment in order to accomplish the court7 s original intent 
to divide the marital estate equally (R. 167-168; 169-171). 
At the August 24, 1987, hearing on plaintiff s motions, 
defendant' s counsel consented to proceed on the basis of 
affidavits rather than testimony (Tr. of Aug. 29, 1987 
hearing, p. 2). The court granted the plaintiff's request 
(R. 260-264). Now, defendant contends that the trial court 
erred in doing so. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court' s discretion to modify a divorce 
decree in light of substantially changed circumstances must 
be accorded considerable deference. Based upon proffered 
evidence of a change in circumstances, the trial court 
5 
modified the Decree of Divorce, and this court should now 
affirm that judgment. 
Defendant' s counsel waived the right to proceed to 
trial under Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of Practice of 
the Third Judicial District. The trial court had the 
inherent power to accept counsel7 s waiver of compliance with 
that rule. 
ARGUMENT 
This court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
consistently adhered to the firmly established principle that 
the trial court' s decisions are to be accorded considerable 
deference in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. 
See, £. a. , Bovle v. Bovle, 735 P. 2d 669 (Utah App. 1987); 
Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P. 2d 1218 (Utah 1980). There is no 
such abuse extant in the present case, and the trial court' s 
decision should be affirmed. 
A. The trial court, recognizing substantially 
changed circumstances, exercised its equitable powers to 
modify the divorce decree. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled, construing and 
applying Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Ann. (1953), that a 
decree of divorce may be modified upon the showing of "a 
6 
substantial change of circumstances of the parties occurring 
since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the 
decree itself. " Lea v. Bowers, 658 P. 2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 
1983). The court, quoting from its prior decision in Land v. 
Land, 605 P. 2d 1248 (Utah 1980), observed: 
It is likewise true that the court 
retains continuing jurisdiction over the 
parties and may modify the decree due to 
a change in circumstances, equitable 
considerations again to govern. 
658 P. 2d at 1215. 
In the instant case, the plaintiff requested the 
court to modify the decree based on several substantial 
changes of circumstance. At the time of the decree, the 
plaintiff had experienced a pattern for many years of being 
paid a substantial bonus in February or March of each year, 
according to the earnings of his employer for the prior year. 
Based upon that established pattern, the court divided 
equally between the parties the bonus that was due in 1986 
for the 1985 earnings year, and required the plaintiff to pay 
to the defendant a lump sum of $27, 750. 00 plus interest (R. 
112). The court also required the plaintiff, according to 
the parties' then current financial circumstances, to pay 
alimony for one year to the defendant and to pay for the 
defendant's attorney's fees (R. 112-113). The plaintiff's 
7 
right to enforce the collection of the lump sum award and the 
alimony and attorney' s fees did not accrue until April 1, 
1987 (R. 112-113). The court's stated reason for the delayed 
right of enforcement was in order to give the plaintiff an 
opportunity to receive his income bonus for the 1986 earnings 
year (R. 113). 
On April 1, 1987, the court reduced all sums due to 
the plaintiff to judgment in the amount of $43, 314. 46 (R. 
144). 
The circumstances contemplated in the Decree 
changed, however, and the plaintiff did not receive his 1986 
income bonus because his employer had suffered severe 
financial difficulties (R. 173). In addition, plaintiff, in 
an attempt to meet his obligations, sold his home in Pleasant 
Grove, Utah, which had been awarded to him in the Decree of 
Divorce. That home had been valued by the court at the time 
of the divorce at $150,000.00. The 1987 sale of the home was 
for a net selling price of approximately $119,000.00, 
producing a net proceed of approximately $20,000.00. The 
court had originally believed that the equity in the home 
would be between $50,000.00 and $60,000.00 (R. 261-262). 
Because the plaintiff s financial and employment 
situation was unclear, the court stayed execution on the 
8 
$43,314.46 judgment for four months while prohibiting the 
plaintiff from alienating or encumbering any of his property 
(R. 146-148). 
The plaintiff was terminated from his employment in 
July, 1987 (R. 173). 
The defendant argues on appeal that these changed 
circumstances do not relate to the bases on which the 
original property distribution awards were made. On the 
contrary, the changed circumstances are directly related 
thereto. The Findings of Fact clearly show that the court 
was attempting to equalize the marital estate, and that the 
plaintiff s anticipated bonuses were a primary basis for each 
award. Finding of Fact No. 11 (R. 105), regarding alimony, 
was based upon the parties' then current financial 
circumstances and those were such that defendant would not be 
allowed to enforce payment of the alimony award until 
plaintiff had received his 1986 bonus. Finding of Fact No. 
12 (R. 105-106), which addresses the award of attorney's 
fees, was also based on the parties' disparity of incomes and 
similarly postpones the obligation to pay until after receipt 
of the 1986 bonus. So, too, does Finding of Fact No. 9 (R. 
104) regarding the lump-sum property award, give the 
plaintiff a grace period until after the award of the 1986 
9 
bonus. The trial court, in the August 24, 1987, hearing on 
plaintiff s Motion to Amend, reiterated the presumption 
inherent in the divorce proceedings that the plaintiff would 
receive his income bonus. 
The court: "Well, I think it is a tough 
thing to know what to do because it is 
true that the property settlement was 
based upon the presumption that he was 
going to get a pretty big bonus, because 
he always had. " 
Tr. , Aug. 24, 1987, p. 14. 
The lump-sum property award was based upon the 
court' s valuation at the time of the decree of the assets 
owned by the parties. The $150,000.00 due in the Pleasant 
Grove home was awarded to plaintiff. The drop in value was 
not foreseen at the time of the Decree. 
As stated by the court in the August 24, 1987, 
hearing: 
. [T]he bottom line, you know, after 
everything happened, that we didn' t 
foresee considering the drop in value of 
the property . . . . 
Tr. , Aug. 24, 1987, p. 16. 
The court, in i t s attempt to equalize the mari tal 
e s t a t e , had assumed the house to be worth $150,000.00 and 
t h a t the p l a i n t i f f would receive his income bonus. Clearly, 
t h e changed c i r c u m s t a n c e s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e t o t h o s e 
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assumptions. 
The defendant argues that the property division 
awards are entitled to greater sanctity than alimony and 
child support awards, and that modification should be granted 
"only upon showing of compelling reasons arising from 
substantial and material changes of circumstances. *' However, 
the Utah Supreme Court in Chandler v. West, 610 P. 2d 1299 
(Utah 1980), ruled that while property settlements are 
entitled to greater sanctity, they are not sacrosanct, and it 
is not beyond the power of the trial court of equity to 
modify them. Id. at 1300. 
In the cases cited by the defendant in support of 
her argument that property awards are entitled to greater 
sanctity, the courts were construing a decree based upon the 
stipulation and property settlement agreement entered into by 
the parties, not an award made by the court after trial. 
For example, in Land v. Land, 605 P. 2d 1248 (Utah 1980), the 
court stated that once the parties reach an agreement, it can 
be modified only when there is a significant change of 
circumstances. The court found it salient that the parties 
themselves had reached an overall integrated agreement and 
found that modification of any particular part should not be 
undertaken without examination of how the whole agreement fit 
11 
together. 
More analogous to the instant situation is the 
Court' s decision in Chandler, supra, wherein the parties had 
entered into a stipulated decree which provided that the 
plaintiff should be awarded the parties' home and that the 
defendant would make all mortgage payments on the property. 
Thereafter, Shirley West Chandler sold the home for a gain of 
$14,000.00 and remarried. The defendant then stopped making 
the mortgage payments. Mrs. West brought the defendant 
before the court, asking that he be required to continue 
making payments until he had paid her the total of the amount 
of the mortgage indebtedness as of the date of the divorce. 
The defendant responded that the remarriage of the plaintiff 
and the sale of the home constituted a material change in 
circumstances justifying a modification of the decree. The 
trial court declined to modify the decree. 
The Supreme Court recognized that, unlike the trial 
court in Land v. Land. supra, which was dealing with 
distribution of specific assets pursuant to a property 
settlement, the Chandler trial court was addressing an order 
for the payment of a monthly mortgage obligation. It was 
observed that, if the payment was support, the trial court 
could eliminate that payment if support was no longer 
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required. If it were a property division and there were 
obviously changed circumstances, the Court stated that, under 
traditional equity standards, the Decree could be modified, 
citing Le Breton v. Le Breton, 604 P.2d 469 (Utah 1979), 610 
P. 2d at 1300. The Court then remanded the case for specific 
findings and conclusions regarding the character of the 
required payments. 
Examination of the instant matter against Land v. 
Land, supra, and Chandler v. West, supra, demonstrates that 
the trial court below was well within its discretionary 
powers to modify the decree. Unlike Land v. Land, the trial 
court herein was not asked to modify a decree based upon a 
stipulated property settlement. Rather, the court below was 
asked to re-examine its own decision. No issue of what the 
parties intended in a stipulation is presented in this case, 
rather, the Court was effecting its own intent. 
A similar problem was resolved in Thompson v. 
Thompson. 709 P. 2d 360 (Utah 1985), wherein an obligation to 
pay a debt was not considered at the time of the divorce. 
Examining that situation, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court's modification of the decree to provide for 
payment of the unrecognized obligation. In the instant case, 
the trial court had declared its intent in the original 
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Decree to divide the marital estate equally (R. 127). Two 
years later, the premises upon which the property division 
awards were made were no longer extant. The trial court has 
simply modified the decree based on the change in 
presumptions incorporated in the original Decree and its 
action are well within its discretionary powers. 
Defendant also argues that the alimony award may 
not be modified, as the payments vested in the defendant as 
they accrued. While defendant' s initial premise is correct, 
the court does have equitable power to moderate the 
enforcement of alimony arrearages. In Adams v. Adams. 593 
P. 2d 147 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court, while finding 
that a trial court has no power to modify a decree as to the 
vested alimony rights, also recognized that the court does 
have the power in equity to moderate the enforcement of 
accrued and unpaid alimony. Jjjl. at 147, fn. 2. Such an 
invocation of the court' s equitable powers was made by the 
non-custodial parent in Harmon v. Harmon. 491 P. 2d 231 (Utah 
1971). The Supreme Court found that a judgment in a divorce 
proceeding is of a different and higher character than a 
judgment in a suit at law. 
In order to carry out the important 
responsibility of safeguarding the 
interest and welfare of children, it has 
always been deemed that courts have broad 
14 
equitable powers. To accept the 
plaintiff s contention that the adjudged 
arrearage is tantamount to a judgment in 
law would, in the long run, tend to 
impair rather than enhance the abilities 
of both the plaintiff and the court to 
accomplish the desired objective. 
Id. at 232. The court recognized that, in carrying out the 
objective of protecting the welfare of the children, it was 
necessary to alter the ordinary post-judgment collection of 
the debt, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court' s 
Order to Stay Execution on the accrued child support 
payments. 
In the instant case, the trial court similarly 
exercised its equitable powers to moderate enforcement of the 
alimony debt. Finding of Fact No. 11 (R. 105) recognized the 
plaintiff s expectation of a large bonus with which he could 
pay the awarded alimony. The court' s subsequent Order merely 
equitably altered the plaintiffs obligation to reflect the 
substantially changed circumstance that the plaintiff did not 
receive that bonus. 
Indeed, the court' s Order arguably did not even 
change that alimony judgment. While it had been expected 
that plaintiff s bonus would be used to pay that award, 
ultimately, the $20,000.00 equity in the Pleasant Grove 
house, which had been plaintiff s prior to the court' s 
15 
modification order (R. 124), was awarded to defendant (R. 
263). Her judgment for alimony was $5,549.80 (R. 160), and 
that sum was more than adequately offset by the proceeds from 
the house' s equity. 
No abuse of discretion has been shown by the 
defendant. in the court' s order to modify the Decree and to 
moderate defendant's judgment thereon. The Record fully 
supports the court' s modification and the defendant' s appeal 
on these matters must fail. 
B. The defendant' s counsel waived the right to a 
trtftl ynfler Supplementary W e 9. 
Defendant's failure to timely object to the format 
of the August 24, 1987, hearing constitutes a waiver of 
defendant' s right to a full trial under Rule 9 of the 
Supplementary Rules of Practice of the District Court (eff. 
June 6, 1987). 
Sperry v. Smith, 694 P. 2d 581 (Utah 1984), is cited 
by the defendant in support of its contention that the trial 
court herein has abused its discretion by failing to comply 
with its own rules. In Sperry, the Utah Supreme Court found 
that the trial court had abused its discretion by refusing to 
set aside a summary judgment after it was brought to its 
attention that plaintiff s attorney had failed to comply with 
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Rule 2. 5 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts of 
the State of Utah. The Rule required plaintiff s attorney in 
that case to give written notice to defendants to either 
appoint another attorney or appear in person at the hearing 
on the Motion for Summary Judgment. Since no notice had been 
given, the Summary Judgment was vacated by the Utah Supreme 
Court and the case remanded for further proceedings. The 
Court' s rationale was based on the fact that there had been 
no waiver by the defendants of the protection afforded by 
that Rule. 
While it may be true that in 
certain instances, trial courts have the 
inherent powers to waive compliance with 
their own rules, no reason has been 
suggested here why there should have been 
a waiver. 
674 P. 2d at 583. 
Clearly, in the instant case, defendant waived the 
right to a full trial under Rule 9. The defendant had ample 
opportunity to object to the format of the hearing, but 
failed to do so. Defendant was mailed a Notice of Hearing on 
the Motion to Amend the Decree on August 3, 1987 (R. 179-
180), and had an opportunity to object to the calendared 
hearing at that time. Defendant had further opportunity to 
object in her Answer to plaintiff's Motion to Amend the 
17 
Decree. No objection was made in that Answer, which was 
filed on August 21, 1987 (R. 265-274). At the hearing 
itself, plaintiff' s counsel was prepared to offer testimony, 
but defendant' s counsel agree to proceed on the basis of 
affidavits (Tr. Aug. 24, 1987, p. 2). Not until midway 
through the hearing did defendant's counsel raise any 
objection to the proceeding. Even at that point, counsel was 
willing to continue with the hearing as long as the court was 
willing to rule in defendant' s favor on the merits. 
(Mr. Peterson): 
If the court is genuinely interested 
and believes there is a basis for 
consideration of modification of the 
property distribution, then I think we 
have a right to a complete trial and open 
that issue, rather than this very short 
hearing and these proffers of counsel, 
which is coming before the court today. . 
[W]e don't think there's sufficient 
cause for even a consideration of change 
of the property; but if there is, then we 
believe we are entitled to a complete 
trial . . . . 
Tr. , Aug. 24, 1987, pp. 9-10. 
While in Sperrv, supra, no reason had been 
suggested why there should have been a waiver, in the instant 
case, no reason has been suggested why there should not have 
been a waiver. Counsel's "clear and strenuous" objection to 
18 
the format of the proceeding was not heard until midway 
through that proceeding. Similarly, in Goeltz v. Continental 
Bank & Trust Co. . 299 P. 2d 832 (Utah 1956), the defendant 
waited until midway through trial to invoke protection under 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant had 
been surprised by new evidence that weakened another defense 
and wished at that point to rely on its previously waived 
statute of limitations defense. The trial court refused to 
amend the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15, and the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed, noting that the surprise testimony had no 
bearing on the statute of limitations defense and the facts 
that were determined were known to defendant at the inception 
of plaintiff s claim. 
The defendant herein has made no suggestion that 
any new turn of events gave rise to the objection brought 
midway through the hearing on plaintiff's Motion to Amend. 
It appears from defendant' s counsel' s argument to the court 
that a potential unfavorable ruling was the only basis for 
the objection. In accordance with Sperry, supra, and Goeltz. 
supra, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
accepting defendant's waiver of a full trial and denying the 
subsequent oral and written objections. 
19 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this case, the court was well within its 
discretion in amending the Decree of Divorce to effect equity 
between the parties. As a result of circumstances beyond the 
control of the parties, the parties' home in Pleasant Grove 
sold for $30,000.00 less than the court believed it was worth 
at the time of the entry of the Decree. In addition, the 
plaintiff was not paid a substantial bonus that was 
contemplated at the time of the Decree and subsequently lost 
his job. None of these circumstances was anticipated by the 
court or the parties at the time of the divorce. 
The Decree in this matter was not entered by the 
court pursuant to agreement of the parties. It was a ruling 
of the court. It is, therefore, more susceptible to 
modification by the court. The trial court has effected 
modification of the Decree so that the original intent of the 
Decree, i. e. , the equitable distribution of the marital 
estate, can be achieved. The trial court's rulings are 
within its equitable powers, and should be affirmed by this 
court. 
The procedure by which this modification was 
effected was proper. Any right to trial that the defendant 
had under Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of Practice of 
20 
the Third Judicial District was waived. The trial court' s 
orders as a result of that hearing should be affirmed by this 
court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
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i"-r. C D I -B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Suite 1330 
310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
GARY W. JENSE, 
Plaintiff, 
v« 
SARA A. JENSE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. D85-702 
Judge Daniels 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 14th day of January, 1986, plaintiff appearing in person 
and by his attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and defendant appearing 
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and each of the 
parties having testified to matters in their respective complaint 
and counterclaim and the matter having been argued and submitted 
and taken under advisement by the Court, and the Court now being 
fully advised hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and has been for more than three months immediately 
prior to the filing of this action for divorce. 
r f f 
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2. Plaintiff and defendant were married in Las Vegas, 
Nevada on the 10th day of January, 1953, and since that time have 
been husband and wife, 
3. Plaintiff has treated defendant cruelly, causing 
her great mental suffering and distress. Among other things, 
plaintiff has failed to meet defendant's emotional needs and 
include her in the financial decisions of the marriage, which 
conduct has made it impossible for defendant to continue with the 
marriage relationship and entitles defendant to a decree of 
divorce from plaintiff on her counterclaim. 
4. Plaintiff and defendant have four children as 
issue of this marriage, all of whom are adults and emancipated, 
and there are no issues of custody or support. 
5. The real property of the parties should be awarded 
as follows: 
a. Plaintiff should be awarded the equity of the 
parties in the house and real property at 9200 North 4650 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities 
outstanding thereon; the rental home at 582 West 850 North, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities 
outstanding thereon; the Tibbie Fork property and the residence 
at 45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to plaintiff 
assuming and paying the outstanding mortgage owing thereon. 
b. Defendant should be awarded the condominium 
at 29 South State Street #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to 
the mortgage outstanding thereon, 
6. The personal property of the parties should be 
awarded as follows: 
a. Plaintiff should be awarded the Dasher 
automobile, the Cadillac automobile, the money in his checking 
account, and the furniture and furnishings and other items of 
personal property currently in his own possession except for the 
items specifically awarded to defendant as provided in the next 
following subparagraph. 
b. Defendant should be awarded the Ford 
automobile, her retirement, the money in her checking account, 
all the furniture and furnishings located in the condominium at 
29 South State #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the following 
items of furniture and personal property currently located in the 
home occupied by plaintiff at 9200 North 4650 West, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah: 
Large antique copper frying pan 
Antique church pew 
French Provincial armchair 
Nantucket rocking chair 
Antique frame sampler 
Hummel figurines 
Bowl from Israel 
Silver hurricane lamp 
3 t;00iI0 
Small spinning wheel planter 
Collection of antique spoons 
Sterling silver goblets 
Silver chafing dish 
Antique cradle 
Rocking chair 
Bicentennial pewter plates 
Poster bed 
Bowl and pitcher (gift from Aunt Louise 
Watts) 
Antique quilt/antique valentines 
Antique quilt from defendant's grandmother 
Moiri chair 
Cross-stitch quilt 
Bowl and pitcher (gift from defendant's 
sister) 
Four Lladro figurines 
Various Royal Doulton figurines 
Collection of "Coalport Cottages" 
Defendant's clothing and personal effects, 
including personal papers, books and items 
which came from her— fami-ly such as photograph 
albums, diaries and similar personal items. 
7. The parties should agree upon a time when defendant 
can receive from plaintiff the items of property to be awarded to 
defendant which are currently in plaintiff's possession, which 
4 \ * v« \ J „'*, Jn_ Jn 
time should be consistent with the schedule of the daughter of 
the parties who is to arrange to pick up the items for defendant. 
8. The obligations and liabilities of the parties 
should be assumed and paid as follows: 
a. Plaintiff should assume and pay the 
various mortgage obligations owing on the real properties awarded 
to him, the Zion's First National Bank note liability shown on 
plaintiff's Exhibit P-l, any income tax liability for his 1985 
income, and any obligations which he has individually incurred 
since the separation of the parties in June, 1984. 
b. Defendant should assume and pay her student 
loan, her installment obligations, and any obligations which she 
has individually incurred since the separation of the parties in 
June, 1984. 
9. In order to equalize the marital estate, defendant 
should be awarded a judgment from plaintiff in the sum of $27,750 
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% from February 24, 
1986, until paid in full. This obligation should be paid by 
plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987, and until paid this 
obligation should constitute a lien agaiirst^ prlaintif ff s real 
property located in Utah County as provided in paragraph 5a above. 
10. As an alimony award from plaintiff to defendant, 
plaintiff should pay defendant an amount equal to one-half of the 
gross bonus earned by plaintiff in 1985 which will be received in 
5 
1986, and upon receipt of the bonus, one-half of the gross bonus 
should be paid to defendant. 
11. The Court finds that defendant based upon her 
current employment is capable of supporting herself and for this 
reason, the Court does not award permanent alimony. However, 
based upon the current financial circumstances of the parties, 
plaintiff should pay to defendant temporary alimony in order to 
give defendant the opportunity to establish herself, which 
alimony should be in the amount of $500 per month for a period of 
one-year commencing with the month of March, 1986, and with each 
installment to be due and payable on the 1st day of the month. 
Because of plaintiff's current financial 
circumstances, however, defendant should engage in no action to 
reduce these installments to judgment or enforce payment thereof 
through execution until April 1, 1987, in order to allow 
plaintiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus for the. 1986 
income year. Each installment of alimony should bear interest 
from the date when due until paid at the rate of 10% per annum, 
and if by April 1, 1987 any installments have not been paid, then 
defendant should be entitled to reduce any-unpaid installments to 
judgment and enforce collection through execution. 
12. In light of the disparity of the incomes and the 
current financial circumstances of the parties, plaintiff should 
be required to pay defendant's attorney's fees in the amount of 
$5,000 together with all costs including appraisal costs incurred 
by defendant in the sum of $670. The obligation for attorney's 
fees and costs should be due and payable by April 1, 1987 and 
shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum until paid. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant is entitled to a divorce from plaintiff 
on the grounds of mental cruelty, which decree shall be final 
upon signing and entry. 
2. The real property of the parties is awarded as 
provided in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact. 
3. The personal property of the parties is awarded as 
provided in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact. 
4. The liabilities of the parties are to be assumed 
and paid as provided in paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact. 
5. Defendant is awarded a judgment from plaintiff in 
the amount of $27,750 as property settlement to equalize the 
marital estate plus interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% per 
annum from February 24, 1986, until paid in full, with payment to 
be made upon the terms and to be secured as provided in paragraph 
9 of the Findings of Fact. 
6. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant an 
alimony award equal to one-half of the gross bonus earned by 
plaintiff in 1985 which will be received in 1986, and upon 
7 
UOOIl-i 
receipt of the bonus, plaintiff is ordered to pay one-half of the 
gross bonus to defendant, 
7. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant temporary 
alimony in the amount of $500 per month for a period of one-year 
commencing with the month of March, 1986, to be paid upon the 
terms provided in paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact. 
8. Defendant is awarded a judgment for the use and 
benefit of her attorney in the amount of $5,000 together with 
costs in the amount of $670 incurred by defendant in this 
divorce proceeding, to be paid upon the terms provided in 
paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact. 
9. Each of the parties is ordered to execute any 
documents necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce when it is entered. 
DATED this &\ day of vvJ - ( U 1 9 8 6 , 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST ^ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
DW'C»*AILJNG CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ^,4ay of , 1986,. 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to: 
David S. Dolowitz 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Attorney for Defendant. 
B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Suite 1330 
310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 72^ £0Q pO. I Oil 
1 - t-\ - ?(t GARY W. JENSE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SARA A, JENSE, 
Defendant. 
C-ZK 7^1 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D85-702 
Judge Daniels 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 14th day of January, 1986, plaintiff appearing in person 
and by his attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and defendant appearing 
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and each of the 
parties having testified to matters in their respective complaint 
and counterclaim and the matter having been argued and submitted 
and taken under advisement by the Court, and the Court having 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now 
therefore, 
?••%'—» aooii; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant is awarded a decree of divorce from 
plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty, which decree for good 
cause shown shall be final upon signing and entry. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant have four children as 
issue of this marriage, all of whom are adults and emancipated, 
and there are no issues of custody or support, 
3. The real property of the parties is awarded 
as follows: 
a. Plaintiff is awarded the equity of the 
parties in the house and real property at 9200 North 4650 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities 
outstanding thereon; the rental home at 582 West 850 North, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities 
outstanding thereon; the Tibbie Fork property; and the residence 
at 45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to plaintiff 
assuming and paying the outstanding mortgage owing thereon. 
b. Defendant is awarded the condominium 
at 29 South State Street #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to 
the mortgage outstanding thereon. 
4. The personal property of the parties is awarded as 
follows: 
a. Plaintiff is awarded the Dasher automobile, 
the Cadillac automobile, the money in his checking account, and 
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the furniture and furnishings and other items of personal 
property currently in his own possession except for the items 
specifically awarded to defendant as provided in the next 
following subparagraph. 
b. Defendant is awarded the Ford automobile, her 
retirement, the money in her checking account, all the furniture 
and furnishings located in the condominium at 29 South State 
#718, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the following items of furniture 
and personal property currently located in the home occupied by 
plaintiff at 9200 North 4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah: 
Large antique copper frying pan 
Antique church pew 
French Provincial armchair 
Nantucket rocking chair 
Antique frame sampler 
Hummel figurines 
Bowl from Israel 
Silver hurricane lamp 
Small spinning wheel planter 
Collection of antique spoons 
Sterling silver goblets 
Silver chafing dish 
Antique cradle 
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Rocking chair 
Bicentennial pewter plates 
Poster bed 
Bowl and pitcher (gift from Aunt Louise 
Watts) 
Antique quilt/antique valentines 
Antique quilt from defendant's grandmother 
Moiri chair 
Cross-stitch quilt 
Bowl and pitcher (gift from defendant's 
sister) 
Four Lladro figurines 
Various Royal Doulton figurines 
Collection of "Coalport Cottages" 
Defendant's clothing and personal effects, 
including personal papers and books and items 
which came from her family such as photograph 
albums, diaries and similar personal items. 
5. The parties are ordered to agree upon a time when 
defendant can receive from plaintiff the items of property to be 
awarded to defendant which are currently in plaintiff's 
possession, which time should be consistent with the schedule of 
the daughter of the parties who shall arrange to pick up the 
items for defendant* 
6. The obligations and liabilities of the parties 
are to be assumed and paid as follows: 
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a. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the 
various mortgage obligations owing on the real properties awarded 
to him, the Zion's First National Bank note liability shown on 
plaintiff's Exhibit P-l, any income tax liability for his 1985 
income, and any obligations which he has individually incurred 
since the separation of the parties in June, 1984. 
b. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay her 
student loan, her installment obligations, and any obligations 
which she has individually incurred since the separation of the 
parties in June, 1984. 
7. In order to equalize the marital estate, defendant 
is awarded a judgment from plaintiff in the sum of $27,750 
together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% from 
February 24, 1986, until paid in full. This obligation is 
ordered to be paid by plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987, and 
until paid this obligation shall constitute a lien against 
plaintiff's real property located in Utah County as provided in 
paragraph 3a above. 
8. As an alimony award from plaintiff to defendant, 
plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant arr amount equal to one-half 
of the gross bonus earned by plaintiff in 1985 which will be 
received in 1986, and upon receipt of the bonus, one-half of the 
gross bonus is ordered to be paid to defendant. 
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9. No permanent alimony is awarded, but plaintiff is 
ordered to pay to defendant temporary alimony in the amount of 
$500 per month for a period of one-year commencing with the month 
of March, 1986, with each installment due and payable on the 1st 
day of the month. 
Because of plaintiff's current financial 
circumstances, however, defendant is ordered to engage in no 
action to reduce these installments to judgment or enforce 
payment thereof through execution until April 1, 1987, in order 
to allow plaintiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus for 
the 1986 income year. Each installment of alimony shall bear 
interest from the date when due until paid at the rate of 10% per 
annum, and if by April 1, 1987 any installments have not been 
paid, then defendant shall be entitled to reduce any unpaid 
installments to judgment and enforce collection through 
execution. 
10. Defendant is awarded a judgment for the use and 
benefit of her attorney in the amount of $5,000 plus costs 
including all appraisal costs incurred by defendant in this 
proceeding in the amount of $670. This obligation for attorney's 
fees and costs shall be due and payable by April 1, 1987 and 
shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum until paid. 
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11. Each of the parties is ordered to execute any 
documents necessary to effectuate the terras of the Decree of 
Divorce when it is entered. 
DATED this °[ day of \J u. ( y , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H rwxow h«*^-*-
DISTRICT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of 
1986, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to: 
David S. Dolowitz 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (8 01) 5 32-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
GARY JENSE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SARA A. JENSE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND 
PRIOR ORDERS OF THE COURT 
Civil No. D85-702 
Judge Scott Daniels 
* * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court, the 
Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, on Monday, the 24th day of 
August, 1987. The plaintiff was present in person and repre-
sented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The defendant was present 
in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson. The 
court, after being advised by the parties that their testimony 
would be in accordance with the written pleadings and affidavits 
they had filed with the court, determined with the agreement of 
counsel for each of the parties, to accept that as being the tes-
timony and then heard and considered the arguments of counsel. 
Being advised in the premises, the court determined that at the 
r - ^  * s \* r 
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time it entered a Decree of Divorce in this matter, July 14, 
1986, it was the intention of the court to equally divide the 
marital estate of the parties and the belief of the court was 
that it had done so; however, there had been significant changes 
of circumstances which rendered that division ineffective* The 
plaintiff has had a pattern for many years of being paid a sub-
stantial bonus in February or March of each year based on the 
earnings of his employer for the prior year. Following that pat-
tern, the court divided equally the bonus due in 1986 based upon 
the earnings in 1985, entered a judgment in paragraph 7 of the 
Decree which required payment by the plaintiff to the defendant 
of $27,7 50.00 plus interest, required the payment of alimony to 
the defendant in paragraph 8 of the Decree and for attorney's 
fees in paragraph 10 of the Decree. In 1986, plaintiff's 
employer received insufficient income and plaintiff did not 
receive a bonus in 1987. As a result, this court determined on 
April 1, 1987, to reduce all of the sums that were due to the 
plaintiff to judgment in the amount of $43,314.46 and stayed exe-
cution on that judgment until the plaintiff's situation became 
more clear. The plaintiff was terminated from his employment in 
July of 1987 as the business entity for which he worked was pur-
chased by Zions UtahBank Corp who merged that entity into its own 
operations and released the plaintiff as there was no further 
need for his services. The plaintiff sold the home of the 
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parties in Utah County which had been valued by the court at the 
time of the divorce at $150f000.00 for a gross selling price of 
approximately $124,000.00 and a net selling price of approxi-
mately $119,000.00 which will produce a net proceed of sale of 
approximately $20,000.00, as opposed to the $50,000.00 -
$60,000.00 the court believed would be produced by the sale of 
that property. In addition, the defendant, between the time of 
the trial of this matter on January 14, 1986, and the entry of 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree on July 14, 
1986, went to the bank where the parties had stored their silver-
ware and removed that silverware from the safety deposit box. 
The plaintiff believed that the silverware was worth $10,000.00 
while the defendant believed that it was worth approximately 
$4,500.00. These circumstances in the opinion of the court con-
stitute a substantial change of circumstance in that the intent 
of the court has been thwarted by events resulting in the defen-
dant being awarded more than one-half of the marital estate which 
requires, in equity, a modification of the Decree and prior 
orders and judgments of the court which, even after the modifica-
tion, results, the court believes, in the defendant being awarded 
more than one-half of the estate of the parties, thus, the court 
must modify the Decree of Divorce and prior orders and judgments 
of this court to provide that the defendant be awarded the sil-
verware that she has removed from the bank deposit box and taken 
-3-
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into her possession and the net proceeds of sale of the home of 
the parties and that upon payment to her of the net proceeds of 
sale, that all prior awards, judgments and orders of the court 
requiring payment to her should be deemed satisfied and paid in 
full and all financial obligations of the plaintiff to the defen-
dant be deemed satisfied. 
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Decree of Divorce and all prior orders and 
judgments of this court which require financial payments by the 
plaintiff to the defendant shall be deemed satisfied and paid in 
full upon the payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the 
net proceeds of sale of the parties' home in Pleasant Grove, 
Utah. 
2. The defendant is awarded all right, title and 
interest of the parties to the silverware that she has removed 
from the safety deposit box of the parties during the pendency of 
the action. 
3. Upon the completion of the payment envisioned in 
paragraph 1 above, the plaintiff shall have met all of his finan-
cial obligations to the defendant and all obligations as herein 
ordered in the Decree of Divorce and the orders and judgments of 
this court shall be deemed satisfied and the defendant shall sign 
any document necessary to, as a matter of record, declare that 
these obligations have been satisfied. 
-4-
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4. Each party should pay their own costs and 
attorney's fees as incurred herein. 
DATED this 7 day of jQ^^_ , 1987. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS REFLECTING 
THE RULINGS OF THE COURT: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CRAIG M. PETERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
DSD:090187D 
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IN THE DISTRICT 10U.IT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI3TR: 
IN AND FOP. SAL* LV<E COUNTY 4- STATE OF UTAH 
— o o O O o o — 
GARY W. JENSE, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
— v s — 
M'T71 I OTv T 0 A M HIND 
SARA A . J E N S E , 
D e f e n d a n t . 
o f 8 : 3 0 a . n . , t h e a b o v e - c a p t i o u e c 1 c a u s e o f a c t i o n came on 
r e g u l a r l y f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e HON. SCOTT DA..\I2LS, o n e oi 
o f t h e above-na^.ec": C o u r t . • *-*. -~i K:?( 
A ? P 
;,or t h e P l a i n t i f f 
For the Defendant: 
A t t o r n e y A t Law 
185 S o u t h S t a t e S t . 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Uta l i 
MR. CRAIG M. PETERSEN 
A t t o r n e y A t Law 
4 2 6 S o u t h 5 t h E a s t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UtaH 
FILED IN CURK«$ OFFICE 
Salt lake County Utah 
JUN 7|903 
H.Dtx^Hin^ey .Clerk 3nlDftt. Court , 
QGfHity Clerk 
JHEREUPON the following proceedings were had: 
1 
2 
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THE COURT: Gary W. Jense versus Sara A. Jense 
Motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce. This your motion, Mr 
Do 1 o\v i t ?., you may proceed 
MR. DOLOWITZ: Court want to hear testimony? It 
would be precisely as set forth in the affidavit. Tvo 
affidavits and two motions before the Court rand if you want, 
I can have that testimony and run through it on the basis thaf: 
it's already before you 
THE COURT: I see no problem in just proceeding 
*® I on the basis of the affidavit unless you have a problem with 
II 
12 
16 
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24 
25 
that. 
MR. PETERSON: iJo, Your Honor. 
" I THE COUT.T: You can proceed 
*
4
 I M K . L0L0..ITZ: Your Honor, on the evidence that 
15 we would put forward, we ask for amendment in two areas. 
First is, we would seek to be credited with ten-thousand 
dollars for the silver that was taken from the safe-deposit 
box;that the silver was in the safe-deposit box at the*time 
we came before you for trial. While we were negotiating the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Decree, it was 
removed and taken by Mrs. Jense. At the time we were before 
you, it was in the possession of Mr. xJense. - Your ruling 
2 3
 would have left it with him. She removed it. We are willing 
to give it to her, but we want credit on the judgment. The 
second item, Your Honor, involves request that the judgment 
• the matters that have been reduced to judgment, 
2 
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$43,314.46 as of April 1st, 1337, be either reduced or deal-
ing fro-.ii our view, totally terminated based on a change o? 
circumstances?that is, my client has lost his job, 
Now, as yo\3 recall, the system wherein he was working 
for, ultimately, Foothill Thrift, based oh his earnings from 
the year before, he would be paid a bonus, Based on his '84 
earnings, there was a substantial bonus in '85. Based on hi<f 
f85 earnings there was a bonus in '86. That ' 35 bonus was 
divided. You had him pay half to Mrs. Jense and he kept half 
You also entered, as part of your judgment., that there 
*
2
 I are $27,000 some odd dollar judgment, alimony and attorney 
" I fees-but after my client had pai^ ofr the taxes that were du-'f 
14 there simply wasn't enough cash, so you stayed execution on 
the judgment until 1987, when the • 95 bonus would come in. 
There was no f 86 bonus. What happened in 1986, Foothill di-: 
not produce enough, so that there COMIC) be a bonus;and when 
we were before you last, Foothill was facing receivership. 
But now, at this point. Foothill has been taken over by 
Zion's Bank. And my client has been released. Not only doe$ 
he not have a bonus for '36, that will be paid in '37, he 
doesn't even have a job. The lasfmofiey that he received 
from his employment, as we set out in the affidavit, is 
approximately $7 000, is what he has received. That was the 
end of his income. He now has to look for a job. The house 
1 
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in Utah County, at least he has an offer on it. 
At the time we were before you, it was $30,000. The sale 
price is going to produce around :3l9,000. We will get r-onva~ 
-where between nineteen and twenty-thousand dollars in cash 
when that sale completes. He has, on the other side, servioef 
the debt that kept the properties together,and while those 
assets were awarded to aim, if hi doesn't service those e^.Jt: 
Mrs. Jense is also a co-signer on those debts. And we have 
Retailed those debts in the affidavit;and she will be equallv 
liable with them. 
under the criteria that has been set out by the Jtah 3u:>re:aa 
Court, v,:e meet the test for a substantial chanqe in circum-
-stancss the> is required to modify the property provi.'-i-r s o 
[the Decree in this case, to give her the silver and somethinq 
to eliminate the rest of the judgment on the chanqe. "-I-/ client 
simply can't pay it;an5 based on the circumstance?, that he 
Kvould have these onqoing bonuses to be able to pay this. "jud-fe-l 
ment th at you made on the marital estate, it is not what you 
fthouqht it was. It has been switched by the silver going froh 
my client to Mrs. Jense;and has been switched by the house 
being over £30,000 less than the Cooar ^ determined that it was. 
(Vet it based the judgment on a $27,000 to equalize the marital 
estate. Now, that wouldn't equalize it. In fact, it would 
make it even more unequal than it already is. 
1 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, We filed an Answer to 
2 Amended Decree of Divorce. Under the terms of the decree of 
3 divorce,the Court directed that Mrs. Jense would receive the 
4 property, which was located in her condominium?that Mr. Jense1 
5 would receive property which he had, and some specific divis-j 
5 -ions, which the Court ordered on personal property awarded 
7 to Mrs. Jense. Those divisions, though they were ordered by 
8 the Court, have not yet been made. That is, Mr. Jense has 
9 not made the transfer, but the silver which is at issue, clea 
10 -rly was not in the possession of Mr. Jense at the time of thfe 
11 li'ja: i:;i^  o::. thin matter ;!.:.*• 1..' 3^ ;an.i h^ "--mew that it '.r^z. ':\^>:*.^ 
12 in his possession. Knew that it belonged to Mrs. Jense. 
13 The silver was located, at the time of the divorce, 
14 in the condominium, where Ilrs. Jense resided here in Salt 
15 Lake City;and that's clear from the affidavit attached to the 
16 Reply, which if-- the affidavit. A Pleasant Grove ban's, shows 
17 the last time these parties had two safe-deposit boxer-—by th 
18 way, the last time either of those boxes were entered into by' 
19 anyone was in March of 1CJ35, when the daughter of the parties 
20 went to the safe-deposit box and removed the silverware,by thi 
21 way, silverware, which Mr. Jense knows was accumulated by 
22 Mrs. Jense from the time she was a sz&all child up to the 
23 date of the marriage;and no addition made to that silverware. 
24 But the Court ordered that would be herr, fully one 
25 year before this matter was heard by the Court. 
That was taken from the safe-deposit box and was in 
her possession. Mr. Jense knows that• I think the represent 
-ations in the affidavits here before the Coir t today are 
clearly not honest. Those items were removed and were in he^ : 
possession at the time of the decree as Mr. Jense knows. In 
addition, the only reason that they were even in the safe-
-^epo-rit VJO"< "ar- because there had been a. series of thefts 
in the filpine neighborhood where they lived. And they had 
removed them an^ ^ut them in the safe-deposit box for a shori*. 
the time of th~ decree of divorce. 
The divorce is accurate-. It's a misrepresentation to 
^ . ^ a t 0 '*"r\ *i~**v? c — ^ ' \ * ~t -o'*•" a~v-*> t "^'1° t b e v C'l^i^ m%^'~ -f^ "^*'„"=• t ^ e .^~v"v~f*. 
I wasn't counsel at the time. But it's a clear misrepresent 
—atio?"} tn -^tatr- no* *' before?, fv- Cou^t e sooe 5 al?" h.3° eo noon 
the af .?:•'"avit r that th^ *~ receive'" an.5 ackno'.rle." ~e-~, that he 
has, fiat th 5.c r^.? in h5.^  oos^e^rion at tha t i m.e« "h: was 
not. The evidence is clear and I have the :records here, 
though I didn't submit them to the Court—I have the records 
of entrance into the safe-desposit box, which will clearly 
show, if the Court wants to review th^Tirthe last time anyone 
entered into either one of these safe-deposit boxes was full}' 
one year before this matter was tried by the Court. I thin:: 
the mot ion is n ot we 11 -f oundod. 7 think it is specious and 
6 
1 I think that us being here today to defend against that 
2 should entitle us to attorney fees and ask for that relief 
3 in response to his motion. Without question that's the case 
4 In addition,as an aside, you'll notice froni i>.:<;. Jense' s affi-f 
5 -davit, that he bases the value of that silver on a financial) 
6 declaration that he himself prepared and signed. Has no 
7 signature of Sara Jense. de set that value at ten~chousand 
8 dollars on that old 1984 loan application, because he was 
9 seeking a loan. 3ut you'll notice also from our Answer,that 
10 the maximum value, based on full retail suggested manufactu-
11 : —"• :- J'--'-"-! •'•-'• /--#> }-; —-••' '--- ce-;t ; . A j L C-VA'. -\\JI^U .;a:;* ^;, # 
12 f i r ^ t and moct i m p o r t a n t unde r t h e t e r m s of t h e O r d e r , a s i t 
13 was e n t e r e d , t h a t p r o p e r t y was i n h e r p o s s e s s i o n a t t h e t ime 
14 t"*• .*' •"• s e t t e r C3""v? b e f o r e t h e Cour-'" and had been in h e r oosses~ | 
15 ^ i o n f o r a t l e a s t a y e a r — M a r c h o f t h i s - - * - . - w a s n ' t h e a r d u n t i l 
16 h p r i ! of ' 3 6 . So, from March f 35 u n t i l A p r i l o^ ' 3 5 , t h a t 
17 o r o n e r t y v;as i n h e r p o s s e s s i o n . The Cour t o r d e r e d she would 
18 have t h a t p r o p e r t y , which was i n h e r p o s s e s s i o n . C l e a r l y a 
19 m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on t h a t p a r t . Second p a g e , t h e v a l u e of it] 
20 i s nowhere n e a r what Mr, J e n s e s a y s . Simply t r y i n g t o g a i n 
21 an a d v a n t a g e by making t h e s e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t o t h e Cour t 
22 here today. 
23 Both of those positions clearly indicated it is not 
24 necessary to be he^ e today on that particular issue. We 
25 shouldn't be here today;as a result, we are entitled to 
attorney's fees and should be awarded we believe in this 
particular hearing* 
The second matter is more disconcerting to me. That{ 
is, Mr. Jense is now before the Court and represents to the 
Court, that because his job status has changed, that the 
Court should come in and modify an award of property, which 
the Court made over a year and. a half ago, based upon the 
circumstances as they existed then. That is, the properties 
as they existed then. 
Mr. Jense had the advantage at that time of receiv-
•'Hi-' C 'ie ~;C "lw , V.'.liC • .'.'.-'.: ' '.*•.:.. i"Ce 7 T. C '.'.--- J- j.V3 oil." "O.Lviv^ .'L-i'• JL.'C -i_O.T 
sale and getting the equity out of it;but as the Court will 
recall from her testimony, Mr. Jense simply left that home] 
Didn't actively market it. It v.,ar- his testimony at the 
previous hearing in April of this year, when we were trying 
to execute on this judgment that he had, that it wasn't 
formally listed. But he h<?d a friend, who had been trying t^ 
market it to some degree in the Utah County area. 
Nov.-, I'll advise the Court, that it finally has soltjl 
and Mr. Jense is suffering the same thing that everyone else 
has suffered, who has received parcels of real property. 
That there is some decline in the-maclcet place. The property 
at that time was listed at approximately $145 to $150,000, 
that is, at the time of the divorce. 
I'll advise the Court that Mr. Jense now represents 
8 
1 to the Court that he has an offer on that at $119,000 \ 
2 That's not honest either. He has an earnest money contract 
3 at $124,500. He has misrepresented the offering price here 
4 today by over $5000 and he knows that. I am curious as to 
5 why he would make tla t representation. He is down by approx-j-
6 -imately 15 % on the value the Court determined based upon 
7 his representations at that time. I think he is boun5 by hi 
8 representation to the Court too, by the fact that he wanted 
9 to receive that properly. He was willing to assume the ri?V 
10 if he could get the property at that time, and assumed the 
12 It's error at this point to come in an" :aako a 
13 modification of a property distribution based upon a chancre 
14 of circumstance^ that has occurred only in th-s 7. as** ^\'* 
15 months, vhen clearly I think it is res judicata completely on 
16 that particular issue. The Court has determined in Fo:ger 
17 versus Folger, that has not just to be a change of circumrta 
18 -ces,but an extraordinary change of circumstances somethin 
19 akin to misrepresentation at the time of the hearing for a 
20 change of property distribution. That's not the case here. 
21 If the Court is genuinely interested and believes thaif 
22 there is a basis for consideration o£-^ nodif ication of a 
23 property distribution, then I think we have a right to a 
24 complete trial and open that issue, rather than this very 
25 short hearing and these proffers of counsel, which is coming 
before the Court today;but I think there is not suffij 
-cient showing and there is not sufficient reason to come in 
and set asi^e a property distribution, which the Court ordered 
at that time;and that's what the Court did. 
.Mrs. Jense didn't get alimony. She was employed an' 
the Court made property distributions and gave her this larg-
sum judgment based upon the property distribution and properi 
values as represented to the Court at the time of the trial. 
The Court accepted the property values which existed then. 
The change between then and now is not sufficient reason to 
simply come in and amend a decree of divorce. 
As I am saying, one, we don't think there is sufficient 
cause for even a consideration of change of the property;but 
if there is, then we believe we're entitled to a complete 
trial on that issue in order to determine, in fact, whether 
there was or was not some sort of misrepresentation at the 
time of the hearing on the trial. 
And again, I think we are here unneccessarily to defeiji: 
-ing this issue and again, I think we're entitted to our fees 
and costs as we have incurred them in this proceeding, Your 
Honor, and based on that, we'll submit it, 
THE COURT: How much isf tTfeT judgment that's owed? 
MR. D3L0WITZ: $43,314.46 as of April 1st. 
MR. PETERSON: Plus interest. In addition, a six 
hundred dollars award of attorney's fees for our appearance 
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before the Court last time, in reality, round figures is| 
forty-four thousand dollars. 
THE COURT: And you're asking that that be forgivef: 
MR. DOLOWITZ: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And what would happen to the $20,000 
of equity that he is going to get on the American Fork home?] 
MR. DOLOWITZ: In the situation that he is involvejc 
in, that he is in a cash negative situation each month and 
he has been using the bonuses each year to pay the debt;he 
has been paying a second mortgage on that home. He didn't 
get a bonus for '83. He still has on-going debts and those 
have to be paid off. 
THE COURT: So.. he would get the $20,000 to pay 
off his debt and a negative cash-flow situation. If I give 
you everything you want. But he would get $44,000 judgment 
forgiven and that would be in return,she would be able to 
"keep the silverware? 
MR. DOLOWITZ: That's correct. That would'be, ij 
you want to call it that, " our dea] " . That's our request.] 
There were a nuniber of statements made about misrepresentat ipn 
I don't think are true and were misrepresented to you. That] 
an awful strong word for counsel touserand I believe you 
ought to look at it. To start out with, he said no alimony.| 
She was awarded alimony for a year. ?/e stayed execution on 
it. That's part of the j n lane nt. Said th-;rs T-"^ re risr^pre]' 
sentations. I said he was going to net $119 on the house. 
net 
that 
kind 
—ent 
Dart 
til 3 
box. 
we o 
The 
.• x . 
but 
h e r~ 
the 
JDidn't say that it was 124* I gave the Court the 
figure rather than the gross figures, because I thought 
war important. That'r- presented ar- though, that is sorae 
of misrepresentation to you. If there is any misrepres4 
at .ion it is thir "business with the silver. When Fr. 
and I tried this case before you on January 14, 1936, 
r.:Liv2:. v'd- in /.vj clients1 s possession in a safe-deposit 
She went to the safe-deposit'box after the trialrwhen 
re sent o-^  c r oxhikits to r~our we presented evar^thin^. 
silver was in his possession not in her condominium, yet 
?et:-::so . stan "s up :oefore you and says w^ all knew it, 
I diin't say we knew it. But at the time the decree was 
5'rp T.ro knew it when we were before ^ou *^n J^ "^ r51 of f ^ "7 
If you want to talk about misrepresentation; that is 
kind of misrepresentation I think the Court should look 
at and examine with particularity. I would suggest that you 
look 
was 
last 
over the t r 5.a 1 ex") .ibit s and von ' ^."!. r-e-- that t"1"^  s i."rrsr 
in my clients' possession when this matte?: was tried
 c 
THE COURT: When was it tried? | 
MR. D0:/7TITZ; Tried in January of 1935. 
THE COURT: Well, according to the affidavit, the 
recorded visit was in March cff 1^35. " , 
MR. DOLOWITZ: The decree recites that we were 
before you on the 14th of January 1935. My client said that 
he had the silverware in his possession at that timorwas in 
his safe-deoosit box as far as he knew;that Mrs Jense aot it 
1 31a(? got it sometime after Mr. Dart and I were befote 
2 you for trial. Taken it out of the box at that time. He 
3 became aware of it sometime—some months after that. That 
4 he and I were talking and he became aware the silverware had 
5 been moved, but at the t ime that we came in before you for 
6 trial, it was our belief that that silver was still in the 
7 safe-deposit box? and I tb.-'n1" that is evidenced by an examiii-
8 -ation of the Findings of Fact that are set out too. 3ut yo^ 
9 understand what our nosition is. All I am doing is to reolv 
10 to what I think was a misrepresentation. If you want a full 
11 tri.^ " on t"->? •-•stt.'-.;- ^-r-<> '••illin^  to ":• it. 7 d>net think 
12 it's necessary ;we fve covered it, I think here. VJhat you're 
13 dealing with is a situation like Chandler versus .vei^ . In 
14 that case the Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a 
15 decree that'told the husband to make payments on the house 
16 mortgage until it was paid off. The wife remarried, sold th^ 
17 ho\ase and then sued on the decree, saying you now have to pa* 
18 me the money for the rest of the house, because I naid off 
19 the money. The trial judge, in that particular case held 
20 that the decree meant what it said. You've got to pay off 
21 that judgment. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, referring 
22 to Chandler versus Chandler and said^jyhen you have signifi— 
23 -cant change of circumstances, you have the power to amend 
24 the decree?you do not simply enforce it. And we're saying 
25 that type of change of circumstances occurred in this case. 
13 
You entered a ruling that found that there should be 
payments from my client to Mrs. Tosara and those were based] 
on certain findings, including the value of the house and 
the pattern of bonuses that ray client received. It did not 
foresee him losing his job so there waid be no bonuses with 
which'to be able to pay the judgment that we're talking 
about;and didn't figure out the house would drop 20 or 30-
thousand dollars, which is more than the aramount you orderecj 
paid over in judgment to equal the marital estate. And we 
are now in a situation where Mrs. Jense is employed and Mr. 
Jense is not. She's the one who is still in the solid 
financial position, not my client. 
THE COURT: Well, I think it's a tough'thing to 
know what to do, because it's true that the property settle-]-
-ment was based upon the presumption that he was going to 
get a pretty big bonus, because he always had. ftnd I didr ^  
think he would have got a bigger bonus than I anticipated. 
On the other hand, I don't tow that it would have changed 
the property settlement. I think, based upon the equities 
of the case, I am going to rule as follows: I am going to-4 
MR, PET3RS0N: Before you rule, I wuld like to malj 
one point. He did get one big bcmu^^which was distributed 
THE COURT: That's right. It was distributed, 
that's right. And as I recall the ruling,that one was goind 
to be cut in half. That's what happened, but we anticipates 
1 
that he would get a bonus in 1937 based upon 1936 
earnings. And just that there is not as much money as they 
thought there was going to be and I don't know what to do 
about -what I am going to do is this ,though. I think tha 
the equity from the home should be to her. She should get 
that $19 or $20,000, whatever it is and the silver should go 
to her;and that's really all there is. And so, I think if 
that goes to her, the remainder of the judgment, the other 
$24,000 will be considered satisfied. Now, I don't suppose 
either of them are going to be too happy with that outcome. 
<iR. P3T3R30N: One point you need to be aware of. 
That $24,000 satisfaction ruling, Your Honor, Mrs. Jense, 
were sh^ . called to testifv, would testify, as you vnade that 
ruling, seven-thousand of that was furniture, which he kept 
and still has ,in part of the furniture distribution, if the 
Court is going to change the ruling in consideration of that 
then I guess, we need to reopen all of it, so that you make 
adequate furniture and personal property distributions as 
well. 
THE COURT: Where is that furniture, in the house?1 
MR. PETERSON: Still in the house. 
MR. DOLOWITZ: We have fffadeTepreated attempts to 
get her to come down and pick it up. None of them have come 
to fruition. 
MR. PETERSON: Talking about that which was awardeld 
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to him, not the furniture that was awarded to her. 
MR. DOLOWITZ: Thought you were talking about 
things that are her's still in the house. 
MR. PETERSON: We still want those. 
MR. DOLOWITZ: Been asking her to come down and 
MR. PETERSON: We have made the request. Simply 
haven't facilitated on the furniture that was awarded to her. 
Her point is very simply, they are in this judgment
 t "^ "©u gave 
consideration of seven-thousand dollars in fiirniture that was 
awarded to "i.im, when you made that judgment. So- as a rerult 
what happened is, he is now receiving satisfaction of $24,000| 
while there was a seven-thounand dollars consideration in 
there that he is still retaining. 
THE COURT: Well, I see your point, but you know, 
the bottom line is, as it turned out, when all was said and 
done, she appears to me has ended up with considerably more 
than half of the marital estate, you know. Maybe that's the 
way it should be;but seems to me that the bottom line, you 
know, after everything happened, that we didn't foresee 
considering the drop in value of the property, considering no) 
bonus there. What was there reallv to divide uo, she still, 
ends up with mere than half of it and half was all she was 
entitled to. She's having to suffer some of the disadvantage) 
of the drop in property and I don't suppose she'll be happy. 
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I d o n ' t s u p p o s e I w i l l e i t h e r . The p r o b l e m i s , 
t h e r e i s n o t a s much money a s he t h o u g h t t h e r e . . w o u l d b e . 
Tha t w i l l be t h e r u l i n g . Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , no 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s w i l l b e awarded f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r h e a r i n g 
and I ' l l a sk Mr. D o l o w i t z t o p r e p a r e an Orde r and submi t it] 
t o Mr. P e t e r s o n f o r a p p r o v a l a s t o fo rm. 
MR. D0L0V7ITZ: I w i l l . 
(WHEREUPON t h i s h e a r i n g was c o n c l u d e d . ) 
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